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The Violence of God: Before and After
T
		 W. J	gs, J.
 In the time in which we live there are many voice that cry out for 
divinely anctioned violence.  Whether it be in the taped dicoure of 
Oama bin Laden and hi lieutenant, or in the jutification for war in 
Af#hanitan and Iraq articulated by the current US adminitration and it 
fundamentalit cheerleader, we hear that God i on the ide of thoe who 
wield power of indicriminant violence in the name of the deity.
 How doe the name of God come to be aociated with violence?  And 
i there an alternative way of namin# God that point u away from 
violence?
 In thi paper I will firt attend to ome of the voice from early 
Chritianity, the voice of thoe who are called “church father.” I do thi to 
notice how initently they call upon u to think of a God without violence, a 
God who tand not in continuity with, but in utter contrat to, the violence 
of empire and nation.
 I will then turn to the contruction in pre-modern Europe of a very 
different view of God, one that make God to be o aociated with violence 
a to make the wielder of human violence to eem like the very 
repreentative of God.
 Finally I will turn to conider ome of the way in which the aociation 
between God and violence are brou#ht into quetion in our own time. 
While thi occur in many way in the theolo#ical and philoophical 
reflection of the lat decade, I will pay particular attention to ome of the 
way in which thi decontruction of the aociation of the divine and 
violence i brou#ht to expreion in the work of Jacque Derrida.
 Throu#hout, what will be evident i that the way the name of God i 
deployed i re#ularly connected to the behavior of thoe who are called 
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upon to imitate the divine a the ima#e and reflection of God in the world.
Part One: Patristic Theology of the Non-Violent God
 We may be#in with one of the mot remarkable document of the early 
church, an anonymou letter addreed to one Dio#netu, who ha been 
plauibly contrued a a ort of tand-in for the Emperor Hadrian in the 
early econd century.
 “A a kin# end hi on, who i alo a kin#, o ent He Him; a God He 
ent Him; a to men He ent Him; a a Saviour He ent Him, and a eekin# 
to peruade, not to compel u; for violence ha no place in the character of 
God.”1)
 Note that “violence ha no place in the character of God” and that thi i 
connected to the idea that God’ on come “to peruade” rather than to rule. 
Thi perpective i elaborated a bit further on:
  “And do not wonder that a man may become an imitator of God. He 
can, if he i willin#.  For it i not by rulin# over hi nei#hbour, or by eekin# 
to hold the upremacy over thoe that are weaker, or by bein# rich, and 
howin# violence toward thoe that are inferior, that happine i found; 
nor can anyone by thee thin# become an imitator of God. But thee thin# 
do not at all contitute Hi majety.”2)
 Once a#ain the initence that violence ha nothin# to do with God. 
Moreover, one cannot imitate God throu#h rule or dominion, for “thee 
thin# do not at all contitute [God’] majety.”  Let u paue here to 
undercore that what i at take i the majety or what we mi#ht term the 
overei#nty of God, yet thi i exprely oppoed to dominion and thu to 
any form of violence.  What i at take i preciely the majety and 
overei#nty of God, one that i manifet in peruaion rather than 
compulion, in what the author call God’ philanthropy, God’ friendhip 
with or toward humanity.
 Thu the author will #o on to init that one may and mut become an 
1) Epistle to Diognetus (7)
2) Epistle to Diognetus (10)
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imitator of God preciely throu#h act of compaion and #eneroity and 
indeed humble ervice toward thoe who are in need.
 Toward the end of the 2nd century the #reatet of all biblical theolo#ian 
of the early church, Ori#en of Alexandria will maintain:
  “And therefore Hi #lory conit in thi very thin#, that He poee 
all thin#, and thi i the puret and mot limpid #lory of omnipotence, that 
by reaon and widom, not by force and neceity, all thin# are ubject.”3)
 Irenaeu will alo write that God doe not coerce even the devil who ha 
brou#ht u into hi power:
 “The Word of God, powerful in all thin# and not defective with re#ard 
to hi own jutice…” Note that what i at take i the jutice and indeed the 
power of God.  Yet ee how thi i articulated, for he continue: “did ri#htly 
turn a#aint that apotay (here Irenaeu i writin# of Satan who ha u in 
hi power) not by violent mean, a the apotay had obtained dominion 
over u at the be#innin#…but by mean of peruaion, a become a God of 
counel. Who doe not ue violent mean to obtain what he deire… o that 
jutice may not be infrin#ed upon…”4)
 The jutice of God i found then preciely in God’ refual of violence, 
indeed in God’ refual of counter-violence a#aint that power that i now 
virtually ynonymou with violence: namely atanic power.
 Irenaeu tate abolutely: “There i no coercion with God” (4.37.1)  
 More than 2 centurie later we will find a very imilar perpective 
articulated by Gre#ory of Nya.  He i reflectin# on God’ determination to 
redeem humanity.
  “What, then, under thee circumtance i jutice? It i the not 
exerciin# any arbitrary way over him who ha u in hi power, nor by 
tearin# u away by a violent exercie of force from hi hold…”5)
 The jutice of God’ act of deliverance i determined by the renunciation 
of any arbitrary power, of any force or violence.
 Thi perpective i typically articulated a well in term of God’ 
3) Ori#en, First Principles, 1.10
4) Against all Heresies, 5.1.1
5) Gre#ory of Nya, Catechim, XXII
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dealin# with humanity.  God doe not coerce obedience but eek #ently to 
peruade u to be #ood.  In thi way human freedom become the 
indipenable corollary to the divine jutice a peruaive.  God alway act 
o a to free humanity from the coercive power of Satan, not in order then to 
offer a new coercion, albeit benevolent. Rather God eek to nurture human 
freedom to be #ood a God i #ood.  Thu Nya will echo a lon# tradition 
when he maintain that “preeminent amon# all i the fact that we are free 
from neceity, and not in bonda#e to any natural power…for virtue i a 
voluntary thin#, ubject to no dominion: that which i a reult of compulion 
and force cannot be virtue.”6) Later John Chryotom ha God peak to 
humanity throu#h hi Son: “I ue no force, nor do I compel, but if any be 
willin# to follow, him I call” (Homily on Matthew, 55).
 Now I cannot here ummon all the writer of the firt 4 centurie of 
Chritianity to preent their tetimony concernin# the non-violent God.  I 
hould recall that thi view i extrapolated to illumine all God’ dealin#, 
even thoe with nature: Bail write that God act toward creation in uch a 
way that God “hold in obedient followin# and unforced conent the nature 
of all thin# that are” (Holy Spirit, 8.19).  Jut a Ori#en had maintained that 
it i “by reaon and widom, not by force and neceity, [that] all thin# are 
ubject”(First Principles, 1.10).
 We aw in readin# the epitle to Dio#netu that humanity i enjoined to 
follow the example of thi non-violent God.  Thu throu#hout thi time 
Chritian were forbidden not only to en#a#e in warfare of any ort but alo 
enjoined not to participate in the adminitration of civil jutice in the empire 
ince thi mi#ht involve them in condemnin# malefactor to the death 
penalty.  Liten to a late voice of thi tradition, the word of Lactantiu, 
whoe Divine Institutes erved a a ort of umma of late patritic theolo#y:
  “For when God forbid u to kill, He not only prohibit u from open 
violence, which i not even allowed by the public law, but He warn u 
a#aint the commiion of thoe thin# which are eteemed lawful amon# 
men. Thu it will be neither lawful for a jut man to en#a#e in warfare, ince 
hi warfare i jutice itelf, nor to accue any one of a capital char#e, becaue 
6) Gre#ory of Nya, The Making of Man XVI.11
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it make no difference whether you put a man to death by word, or rather by 
the word, ince it i the act of puttin# to death itelf which i prohibited. 
Therefore, with re#ard to thi precept of God, there ou#ht to be no exception 
at all; but that it i alway unlawful to put to death a man, whom God willed 
to be a acred animal” (Divine Institutes, 6.20).
 Now, it i manifet how far removed we are from thi whole perpective 
of the early church when we recall that it i preciely thoe who think of 
themelve a the mot conervative Chritian who are the mot vociferou 
voice callin# for military ervice and for the continuation of the death 
penalty in our own ociety.  We have come a very lon# way indeed from thi 
early Chritian conenu concernin# divine and human violence.
 How are we to account for the unanimity of ancient Chritian tetimony 
in thi repect, a unanimity that eem o at variance to what for o many 
today i the commonene linka#e between violence and the name of God?
 Thi critique of divine violence, thi initence that the God of Chritian 
i not violent, i no mere theolo#ical fancy.  It i alo at heart a critique of the 
violence of empire.
 Perhap it would help to recall omethin# of the violence with which 
thee early Chritian had to contend, the violence of the Roman empire, a 
violence that preented itelf a the very face and force of the divine.
 For early Chritian the force of violence come to clearet expreion in 
the intrumentality of crucifixion.  Thi wa a military rather than a civil 
penalty.  It wa applied to thoe who eemed to ubvert the tructure and 
le#itimacy of the empire.  The idea of crucifixion wa to impoe a death o 
public and o horrifyin# a to make reitance to the empire eem 
unthinkable.  The bodie of the condemned, rebel or ecaped lave, were 
nailed to cro beam o a to be elevated above the paerby, uually alon# 
the road leadin# into or out of the city.  The bodie were tripped naked and 
lacerated o a to draw the flie that would cover them.  They were left there 
to die a low and humiliatin# death.  They were #enerally left on their 
croe lon# after death, for the bodie to rot and be picked to bit by the 
crow, and whatever fell to the #round by the do#.  Thu all who paed by 
134
for day and indeed week would ee diplayed the ferocity and 
implacability of Roman rule.  Crucifixion wa a ava#ery like that of the very 
#od.  All who dare to challen#e Roman imperial military rule will face a 
wrath like that of the #od.
 Often croe would bear the bodie of core, ometime hundred of 
reiter, a had happened in the cae of Corinth le than a century before 
Paul founded hi community of Chrit-follower there. 
 Thi may eem far ditant to u in it ava#ery, but the trata#em of 
military domination in the ervice of empire are not a far removed a we 
would like to think.  Note the #lorification and invocation of divine violence 
in the term “rollin# thunder”(to name carpet bombin# in Af#hanitan) or 
“hock and awe” in Ba#hdad.  The purpoe i alway that of trikin# terror 
in thoe who mi#ht otherwie dare to defy the enra#ed fury of the #od, and 
the ima#e and likene of #od, the imperial intrument of divine fury and 
wrath.
 Now all early Chritian, indeed all who dwelt within the bound of 
Roman rule, would know from firt-hand and #rueome experience the 
tench and horror of thi diplay of imperial violence.  And the Chrit 
follower amon# them would alo know that thi i the fate that had befallen 
their lord, God’ own Meiah; and that it wa a fate that could eaily befall 
any who followed one who had o publicly been marked a an enemy of 
Roman rule.
 Thu the cro of Jeu, and ubequently the croe of hi follower, 
were embedded within thi hitory of peudo-divine violence.  It i a#aint 
the back#round of thi diplay of violence in the intrumentality of 
crucifixion that we mut read the early church theolo#ian’ lan#ua#e about 
God.  For what i trikin# about thi lan#ua#e i how initent they were in 
portrayin# a God who renounced everythin# that macked of imperial 
violence.
 Thu the initence upon the non-violence of God i an implicit critique 
of Imperial rule.  It i, one mi#ht ay, a political theolo#y.  Rule by coercion, 
by force, by arbitrary decree, by violence, i characteritic not of divine rule 
but of the rule of Satan, a rule that even now i bein# overthrown by the rule 
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of the God who refue violence and rule only by wie peruaion and 
#entle love.
 It i manifet that thi perpective come to be replaced by another: one 
that will increain#ly aociate God with violence, indeed with violence 
itelf.  It i to a brief hitory of that ad tale that I now turn.
Part Two:  The Violence of God
 By the late medieval period, God wa bein# portrayed a heer will, 
untrammeled by any conideration of #ood and evil, or rather the will of 
God could be portrayed a that which made #ood and evil and wa not to be 
quetioned.
 Thu, for example, Dun Scotu, who died in the be#innin# of the 14th 
century (d. 1308), could affirm: “The will of God i the norm and the #round 
[re#ula et ori#o] of jutice.”7)  Moreover Scotu maintain: “The divine will i 
the caue of Good, and o by the fact that He will omethin# it i #ood.”8) 
Thu, intead of God bein# jut and #ood in accordance with ome 
reco#nizable meanin# of thoe term, we have jutice and #oodne bein# 
imply whatever it i that God will, a will that i utterly independent of any 
uch criteria in advance.
 William of Ockham, who died nearly a half century later (d. 1347), took 
thi a bit further, maintainin# not only that God’ action whatever it i, i 
#ood and the #ood i determined entirely by whatever it i that God 
happen to will.  Ockham can even uppoe that God can will the in of the 
inner ince God “i not obli#ed to do the oppoite of that which i a in, 
becaue [God] i a debtor to no one.”9)
 The conequence i then drawn that if God will for a man to do that 
which i a in then it i not a in to do it.  Thi i hi explanation: “By the 
very fact that God will omethin#, it i ri#ht for it to be done…Hence if God 
were to caue hatred of himelf in anyone’ will, neither would that man in 
7) Pelikan, vol. 4, p. 26; Rep. Par., 4.14.1.8
8) Copletone 2.2; Rep., 1.48 q.un
9) Phil. Writings p.146.
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nor would God…”10)
 Thu at the level of a certain philoophical theolo#y, one that will be 
very influential for the Reformation, divine will i made to be utterly 
trancendent of the #ood or even the jut, not to mention the kind or 
#enerou. Thu the ta#e i et for the poibility of aociatin# the divine 
with violence in way that would have been completely unima#inable for 
early Chritian theolo#ian.
 How did thi come to pa?
 1.   Of coure we hould not for#et the compromie of Chritianity with 
imperial authority that be#in with Contantine.
 In the firt place thi can make the application of lethal force eem to be 
in harmony with the divine will.  Accordin#ly, the medieval period i 
punctuated by period of cruade a#aint thoe identified a the enemie of 
God.  Thee cruade certainly had a very complicated et of motive and 
rationale.  But they erved to etablih the lived plauibility of the union of 
divine will with military force.
 The #roundwork for thi had been etablihed in the victory that the 
i#n of the cro alle#edly #ave to Contantine, leadin# to the aociation of 
imperial (military) power with the cro: urely the mot ironic reveral in 
Chritian hitory.  And Au#utine had reluctantly paved the way for the ue 
of imperial military power a#aint chimatic Chritian in North Africa in 
the Donatit controvery.
 Thu the cruade, which were often internal cruade a#aint odd 
#roup of Chritian uch a the Cathari or Albi#hinian, eemed to make 
eminent ene within the emer#in# frame of reference provided by the 
aociation of the divine will with lethal force.  Thi then could be uefully 
mobilized a#aint the Ilamic conqueror of the holy land and, eventually, to 
detroy the citadel of Eatern Orthodox Critianity a well, the city named 
for Contantine himelf, with whoe “converion” the alliance between God 
and military force had been be#un.  Thi i another of the upreme ironie 
that mark the hitory of Chritianity.
 But there are additional factor which, taken to#ether, help to provide a 
10) Coppletone, 3.1, p.116; ent 9E-F
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context of plauibility for thi tranformation.
 2.  The doctrine of predetination
 In the work of Au#utine the doctrine of predetination i developed 
within an overall framework of a theolo#y and philoophy of love.  In thi 
context predetination i imply a trai#htforward application to the divine 
human relationhip of what we alo know from interhuman relationhip: 
that the love of the other i pure #ift, unmerited favor.  The other’ love for 
me cannot be explained by my own wonderful qualitie; why me rather than 
another? i fundamentally not a quetion but an expreion of deep and 
baffled #ratitude.
 The divine love i utterly unwarranted by my/our #ood qualitie.  Thi 
i the import of Au#utine’ reflection on hi own bein# found by God.
 Thu for Au#utine to #round the divine favor in one’ own merit 
would be to detroy the #race-like or #ift-like reality of thi experience.  Thi 
i why he eem o oppoed to the Pela#ian perpective.  Au#utine had 
been a teadfat champion of human freedom, but when it come to thinkin# 
of the divine favor he i reolute in emphaizin# the divine #ratuity above all 
ele.
 Now read within the context of a philoophy or theolo#y of love, 
Au#utine’ reflection on predetination make a certain ene, have a 
certain intuitive appeal, however much we may be troubled by ome of the 
econdary conequence, what we mi#ht term the collateral dama#e of thi 
approach.
 But when thi doctrine come to be revived in the early middle a#e, for 
example by Gottchalk, thi #eneral framework recede from view.  We are 
then left with God’ purely arbitrary will that chooe ome for alvation and 
other for damnation in a ri#orouly conitent doctrine of double 
predetination.  At firt when Gottchalk developed thi doctrine with a one 
ided ri#or that had not been part of the Au#utinian ynthei, hi view 
were #reeted with a certain horror and he wa imprioned for hi view.  He 
held to them with a martyr’ tubbornne, however. 
 In time it wa a#reed that Gottchalk mut be re#arded a correct in hi 
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readin# of Au#utine (and of Au#utine’ readin# of Paul).  Interetin#ly, 
however, the official church wa never epecially fond of thi doctrine, o 
that it become a ort of rallyin# cry for movement of reform.  Wycliffe 
(d.1384) for example made it a central part of hi preachin# at Oxford, a did 
the wanderin# lay preacher who ou#ht to pread hi reform.  And we 
know that it come to be heavily emphaized by Luther and epecially by 
Calvin in their reform movement.
 Now why doe it erve a a rallyin# cry for reform?  Becaue the church 
had much to #ain by tellin# the faithful that what they did or did not do in 
term of obedience to the church and it intitution made a i#nificant 
difference with repect to eternal alvation.  The variou way of bribin# 
upport for the church’ authority were undercut by the view that God 
decided upon the alvation of ome alto#ether apart from their merit.
 Now my point i not to develop the extraordinarily ubtle et of 
ar#ument that render the notion of double predetination plauible or 
worthy of reflection. (I am after all an Armenian and #lad of it.)
 Rather I want to point to the way in which uch a doctrine leave to one 
ide the way in which patritic theolo#ian maintained that God eek to 
peruade u rather than to force u to accept alvation.  By makin# #race 
overei#n it ha the tendency a well to make will overei#n.  And a 
predetination become explicitly double (a it wa not yet for Au#utine) 
the divine will i aociated with rather #rueomely ima#ined torture 
which, however much they may have been re#arded a deerved, will make 
the divine will compatible with a certain violence.
 That God can will the punihment of hi enemie, indeed their eternal 
torture, i a view that ha certain real life conequence in the here and now, 
or at leat the then and there of the medieval period. 
 It wa not imply cruade that could be licened in thi way.  That God 
could poitively will eternal torment for thoe he choe to damn could alo 
be developed in way that made the inquiition, with it burnin# of heretic 
and witche, eem almot humane by comparion to the divinely willed 
eternal torture of the rejected. Indeed one could maintain that the fire that 
conumed the heretic were by comparion a blein# if by thi mean the 
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oul mi#ht be purified, leadin# to a lat #ap renunciation of the herey. 
Thereby one could burn the body to ave the oul.  It i important to 
remember that thi wa by no mean only a Catholic idea and practice but 
one enthuiatically embraced by Protetant, epecially Calvinit 
Protetant, into the 17th century. 
 3. God a Caue (Aritotle to Au#utine).
 In the 13th century theolo#ian in the Wet became aware of Aritotle 
throu#h the work of Ilamic and Jewih thinker.  Thi deeply challen#ed 
the unrivaled upremacy of a certain Platonim in wetern theolo#y.  It fell to 
Thoma Aquina to eek to demontrate at #reat len#th the compatibility of 
Chritian teachin# with the method and alo with many of the principle 
perpective of “the philoopher,” a Aritotle came to be called.
 It wa within thi framework that it became important to reconceive the 
relation of God to the world in term of cauality.  The importance of thi 
hould not be underetimated ince it would alo lay the foundation for the 
emer#ence of an independent cience of the world, the o-called natural 
cience.  But it had it firt effect in a reconfi#uration of God’ relation to 
the world.
 Thoma’ famou five proof for the exitence of God depended upon 
the reflection of Aritotle upon cauality.  But the one of thee that i 
detined to play the lar#et role i that of efficient and thu of firt caue.
 What thi mean i that all event may be undertood in term of 
cauality and that the ultimate caue i alway God. Now jut compare thi 
with the view of o many theolo#ian of the early church that even with 
repect to created nature God rule not by compulion or neceity but by 
the peruaive power alone of widom and #oodne. In the coure of the 
next few centurie thi will come to be undertood a if God i not only the 
firt or the final caue but baically the only caue.  Thi i the rather extreme 
view of particular providence explicitly  articulated and defended by 
Zwin#li, who we may alo recall wa a warrior who led the army of the 
reformation into battle.
 Now it i rather imple to ee how the idea of God a will and the idea 
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of God a caue could coalece in uch a way a to make God reponible for 
whatever mi#ht happen. A we know only too well thi ue of God ‘ will a 
an explanatory principle not only for ultimate alvation and damnation but 
for all that happen in the world i mot often invoked at the point of 
explainin# or accountin# for event that caue dama#e to human bein#. 
Thu for example inurance companie identify a act of God not winnin# 
the lottery but earthquake and tornadoe. And every pator know the 
invocation of the incrutable will of God when bad thin# happen to #ood 
people.
 Once a#ain the idea of God i developed in uch a way a to make 
event that do violence to life the conequence of divine cauality and thu 
of divine will.
 In the late middle a#e thi connection between divine cauality and 
will on the one hand, and utter devatation of whole population on the 
other, wa made vivid throu#h the experience of the pla#ue or “black 
death,” which appear to have killed one third of the population of Europe 
in the mot #hatly ima#inable way. The wollen darkened tortured bodie 
of the dyin# and the dead were a hared earin# experience in every home 
and hamlet of Wetern Europe.  It i baically impoible for u to ima#ine 
thi horror that played out in low motion over the coure of everal year.
 Now how could omethin# o utterly horrific be explained, be 
undertood?  By now we have notion both of God a will to ave or damn, 
and a caue of event, of powerful and perhap epecially of violent event. 
To thi only needed to be added the violent ra#e of God, who i determined 
to wreak ven#eance upon humanity for it manifold in and wickedne.
 Indeed the ima#e of a wrathful God haunt, talk Europe in thee year 
that lead up to the reformation. And, a#aint that back#round, we can 
undertand how Luther i entirely conumed by the quetion of findin# a 
merciful rather than a ven#eful, wrathful deity.  A a conequence of thi 
quet Luther will undertand Paul to mean the for#ivene of in when he 
peak of #race.
 Now I may point out a a corollary to thi that we #et the appropriation 
of Anelm’ undertandin# of the lo#ical neceity of the incarnation and the 
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death of the on in uch a way that God come to be thou#ht of a the author 
of the violence inflicted upon Jeu.  Thi perpective i of coure read back 
onto Paul’ ar#ument, epecially in Roman.
 Many feminit and womanit theolo#ian have pointed out that thi 
view, taken too literally, lead to an atonement theory that ound like the 
jutification often, too often, heard for dometic abue.  But it i no accident 
that a view of atonement for#ed within the ideolo#ical tructure I have been 
ketchin# hould not hy away from attributin# a certain redemptive 
violence to the way of God, even at the cot of makin# it eem that the cro 
itelf wa not rebellion a#aint God but God’ own act, a fulfillment of the 
direct will of God.
 Now all of thee factor taken to#ether will help to make increain#ly 
plauible the view of God a one who exercie arbitrary and thu violent 
rule.  God ha been identified with thoe who rule by force, God’ will ha 
been tied to an arbitrary determination of eternal tranquility for ome, but 
alo of eternal torture for other, makin# poible the application of earthly 
torture a an anticipation of the eternal torment merited by thoe who God 
oppoe.  The identification of God a caue of the world and of all that 
tranpire in the world open the way for God to be undertood a the caue 
above all of what caue all human ufferin#, even the ufferin# of God’ 
own “Son.”
 In hort, God ha become almot ynonymou with violence.  So much 
o that God now appear a the ima#e and likene of Roman imperial rule, 
a rule whoe violence the early church had aociated not with God but with 
Satan.
Part Three: The Return of the Pacific God
 In the aftermath of the paroxym of human violence in the firt half of 
the 20th century, violence rather routinely linked with Divine anction, 
theolo#ical and philoophical reflection ha be#un to work at way of 
diociatin# God from violence.
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 In thi way, often without knowin# it, the theolo#ical and philoophical 
tradition may be een to be returnin# to view of the divine non-violence 
that were the common perpective of earliet Chritian theolo#y.
 Thi fundamental reconideration make it way into contemporary 
thou#ht throu#h a number of avenue.  
 In the En#lih-peakin# world, a world that i the offprin# of Scotu, 
Ockham and Wycliff, a revival of a patritic perpective i to be found in 
Alfred North Whitehead’ Process and Reality.11)  In Part 5 he famouly write: 
“When the Wetern world accepted Chritianity, Caear conquered; and the 
received text of Wetern theolo#y wa edited by hi lawyer… The brief 
Galilean [and we will add patritic] viion of humility flickered throu#h the 
a#e uncertainly…The church #ave unto God the attribute which belon#ed 
excluively to Caear…the Galilean ori#in…[and we will add the patritic 
development of that ori#in] doe not emphaize the rulin# Caear, or the 
ruthle moralit, or the unmoved mover. It dwell upon the tender element 
of the world, which lowly and in quietne operate by love…”(520-21). 
And a few pa#e later Whitehead will write: “God i the #reat companion, 
the fellow ufferer who undertand”(532).
 In hi Religion in the Making he will write concernin# what he call 
purified reli#ion: “it i the difference between the enemy you conciliate and 
the companion you imitate”12) (40).  In thee word we eem thrut back into 
the perpective of the letter to Dio#netu, accompanied by a metaphyical 
viion that eem at leat omewhat compatible not only with Ori#en but 
alo with the #reat Cappadocian creator of trinitarian doctrine.  Of coure 
Whitehead wa or eem to have been lar#ely i#norant of that theolo#ical 
tradition.  
 But in Germany durin# and followin# the Second World War we find 
another way of pointin# to a different God than the God of violence and 
utter overei#nty.  We hear it in the word of Bonhoeffer, who write from a 
Nazi prion that only a ufferin# God can help.  But we find thee eed of a 
new way of thinkin# about God brou#ht to mot dramatic expreion in the 
11) Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (London, Macmillan, 1929).
12) Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York, Macmillan, 1926).
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work of Jur#en Moltmann, be#innin# with hi book The Crucified God.  Thi 
theolo#ical viion ha been of utmot importance for me in my own 
development but I want to turn to a quite different voice that I believe will 
help u to ee the take involved in eekin# to think a #od without violence: 
the atonihin# French philoopher Jacque Derrida.
 In thu turnin# to Derrida I could be#in with hi early en#a#ement with 
the thou#ht of Levina in “Violence and Metaphyic” or hi later 
en#a#ement with the thou#ht of Walter Benjamin in “The Force of Law”, a 
text that play an important role in my own work, Reading Derrida/Thinking 
Paul: On Justice.  But I turn intead to a quite late text of Derrida, one that 
appeared in En#lih tranlation the ame year a Derrida’ death.
 In 1966 Martin Heide##er #ave an interview with Der Spiegel, an 
interview that in accordance with hi wihe wa publihed only after hi 
death ten year later.13)  In that interview he wa led to peak about the 
emer#ent #lobal technolo#ical ocial reality.   The triumph of technolo#y had 
already then reached the point that the diappearance of the pecifically 
human eemed  to be inevitable.  In the meantime, of coure, thi #lobal 
technolo#y ha accelerated to the rhythm of a binary beat a computerization 
of communication, of economic and of war ha made the virtual 
inditin#uihable from the ‘real’.  Perhap a way to #rap what it wa that 
Heide##er wa tryin# to think 40 year a#o i to recall the ima#e of the 
movie The Matrix, in which the human ha already become but the raw 
material for the elf perpetuation of nano-tech machinery.14)
 In thi reflection on the #lobalized technolo#ization of reality Heide##er 
famouly aid: “only a #od can ave u.” By thi he eem to have meant 
firt, that humanity a uch can no lon#er ave itelf from it own elf-
inflicted dehumanization.  The very triumph of cience, of medicine, of 
economic miracle, of communication, and o on only ti#hten inexorably the 
nooe of human elf-detruction.  But if humanity can not ave itelf, if 
indeed all it attempt at elf-alvation only haten humanity’ own demie, 
13) “Only a God Can Save U,” Philosophy Today (Winter, 1976), pp.267-284.
14) The atonihin# admixture of Gnotic, mytery, manichean, and ‘pa#an’ alon# with 
Chritian redemption theme may have added to the movie’ appeal.
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then if there i to be alvation for humanity, thi can only be accomplihed 
by what he, an atheit perhap,15)  call: a #od.
 And the tak of thou#ht, he claim, can only be that of preparin# for the 
comin# of uch a #od, perhap awakenin# the hope or at leat the yearnin# 
for uch a comin# of a #od “of keepin# oneelf open for the arrival of uch a 
#od” (278),16) perhap throu#h attainin# to whatever lucidity i poible 
about the pecific feature of our pli#ht.  It i thi work that Heide##er 
peak of a “the tentativene and inconpicuoune of thou#ht in contrat 
to the #lobal power… of technolo#y”(280).17)
 Four year a#o another philoopher who had in the meantime aumed 
the mantle of “the world’ mot famou philoopher” that had been worn 
15) Heide##er’ atheim i of the order of an immanentalim.  Some, like Tillich and 
MacQuarrie, thou#h in different way, have ou#ht to identify Heide##er’ talk of Bein# 
with a kind of Bein# itelf that can even be poken of a #od beyond #od, a Tillich 
purported to do.  But even if the le#itimacy of uch a move could be etablihed it 
would in no way anwer to what Heide##er here call “a #od” ince, a both Tillich and 
MacQuarrie aw, bein# i not a #od at all, that i, not a bein# but bein# itelf or a uch, 
the bein# of bein#.  “A” #od would then have to be a bein# amon# bein# and not 
bein# itelf and thu what Tillich and other feared a an idol.  That Heide##er i here 
thinkin# not of bein# a uch but of “a” bein# i made clear in an earlier eay “The 
Turnin#” baed on a lecture #iven in 1955, in which he write: “…for the #od alo i $ 
when he i $ a bein# and tand a a bein# within Bein# and it comin# to preence…” 
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays tran. William Lovitt  (Harper & 
Row, New York, 1977), 47.
16) Thi waitin# doe not aure, till le ret upon the aurance of, the comin# of uch a 
#od.  For what may appear i the final abence of uch a #od and thu the abence, the 
lack of any alvation at all, and o the final end of humanity a uch.  Waitin#, watchin#, 
may in the end be but the lucidity that clin# to ome ort of rationality futilely, until the 
end.  Thu in addition to waitin# for the comin# of uch a #od the tak of thou#ht (and 
of poeticizin# a he ay) i alo a readine for the abence of uch a #od and thu for 
the time of founderin#, of Untergang, the end of humanity.  For hope that i hope and 
not plannin# or pro#rammin# or a urreptitiou form of knowled#e i preciely 
uncertain, cannot #uarantee it own object of deire.  It i rather more like what Paul 
call hope a#aint hope.
17) The tentativene and inconpicuoune of thou#ht i preciely correlate to Paul’ 
peakin# of the folly and weakne of the mea#e concernin# the cro.  Here we 
anticipate a well the thou#ht of Derrida concernin# the weakne of decontruction, a 
weakne that i nonethele a power.  And Heide##er wonder about the end “if 
poetry and thou#ht do not once more ucceed to a poition of mi#ht without force” 
(277).  But what i, mi#ht without force?  For more on thi ee my reflection in Reading 
Derrida/Thinking Paul: On Justice (Stanford, Stanford Univerity Pre, 2005).
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decade before by Heide##er, Jacque Derrida, returned to the ayin# of 
Heide##er: “only a #od can ave u”.  The context of Derrida’ reflection i 
what may be termed the pot 9/11 world, a world of the #lobalization of 
mi#ht deployed in the interet of virtual capital that peak of itelf a the 
“end of hitory” and which now eem bent on turnin# the world into the 
arena of war without end in order to defend the ri#ht of ome to hop til 
they drop (our one true patriotic duty) and of a very few other to 
accumulate the virtual marker of economic ucce (meaured, 
appropriately, by the number of zeroe that can be attached to any actual 
number), while the overwhelmin# majority of human bein# are reduced to 
object of what Foucault had called biopolitic18), what Gior#io A#amben, the 
Italian philoopher, call naked life, whoe detiny i only to be controlled or 
dicarded, and whoe ima#e and realization i the concentration camp.19)
 Over the lat 20 year before hi recent death, Derrida had become more 
and more identified a the thinker of the “to-come,” the thinker whoe 
thou#ht  i preciely an attempt to think the comin# of jutice, of #ift, of a 
hopitality to the comin# of what he increain#ly identified a a “democracy 
to come.” And it wa to addre thi quetion, thi hope or thi prayer for the 
comin# of a humane ocial reality that had been condened in the metaphor 
of a democracy to come that Derrida had been invited to peak in the 
hadow cat upon thi hope or thi prayer by the neoliberal #lobalization of 
economic and unendin# military warfare unleahed in the name of 
combatin# terrorim, a combat that only increae the hold of terror itelf.20)
 What doe it mean to hope for a democracy to come when democracy 
ha been de#raded to uch an extent that it i in the name of democracy that 
the force of dehumanization are racheted up to the fever pitch that 
characterize the policie of the United State.
18) Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended Lecture at the Colle#e de France 1975-76 
(Picador, New York, 2003), pp.239-264.
19) Gior#io A#amben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, Stanford 
Univerity Pre, 1998).  See alo hi Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive 
(Zone Book, New York, 1999).
20) For ini#htful comment on thi ee Derrida’ interview “Autoimmunity: Real and 
Symbolic Suicide” in Philosophy in a Time of Terror (Chica#o, Univerity of Chica#o 
Pre, 2003).
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 It wa thee policie that had evoked from Noam Chomky the remark 
that the US wa a ro#ue tate and thi provide the title, if not the content, of 
the reflection undertaken by Derrida : Rogues.21)
 Derrida doe not fall into the trap of uppoin# that it i imply a matter 
of “re#ime chan#e” in the US, for the force of neoliberal economic and of 
cyber urveillance, of virtual warfare of the tron#et a#aint the weaket, 
have little to do with whether or not the cowboy cabal that ha taken power 
in Wahin#ton i replaced by a kinder, #entler, or at leat more diarmin# 
and more articulate and reaurin# technocracy.
 What i at take rather i whether there i any hope at all for the comin# 
of a fundamentally other polity, one that hear and heed the call and claim 
of jutice, of humanity, of life. Can thi hope or deire or yearnin# or prayer 
even be thou#ht? What could it mean to be faithful to uch a deire, to uch 
a prayer?  To be reponible to it and for it?  To turn toward the comin# of 
that which i worthy of a truly human and humane hope?
 It i in thi connection that Derrida turn to a complex reflection on, 
amon# other thin#, the quetion of overei#nty. For overei#nty i the name 
of control, of capability, of can do.  It i in the name of overei#nty, for 
example, that the US exempt itelf from the law that it piouly impoe 
upon the ret of the world; it i in the name of overei#nty that we call 
ourelve, a Madeline Albri#ht aid: the exceptional nation.  But it i alo in 
the name of overei#nty that other nation eek to defend themelve from 
the predatory financial peculation that call itelf “free trade,” or from the 
bli#ht of McWorld ubtitute for culture, or from the threat of military 
extermination reerved for thoe who balk at the impoition of the new 
world order of the freedom to hop.
 Can overei#nty ave u?  If not the overei#nty of a nation then the 
overei#nty of a hyper nation, of the union of nation of a overei#n United 
Nation?  Or i thi only the conummation of the rule of force, of overei#n 
power, a dream that become the ni#htmare of total force till in the interet 
of thoe with power? 
 It wa the German political philoopher Carl Schmitt who famouly 
21) Jacque Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford, Stanford Univerity Pre, 2005).
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declared that baic political concept are ecularized theolo#ical concept.22) 
And certainly thi eem to be true of the idea of overei#nty.  For 
overei#nty i the claim to be in control, a claim that mot fundamentally i 
made of God, the one who i “in control” of creation and of hitory. It i in 
imitation of that overei#nty, that omnipotence, that the divine ri#ht of kin# 
wa maintained in Chritian Europe, or of Pope till today.  And when that 
power of kin# i tranferred to the tate, it i till the tate that ha the 
monopoly of le#itimate force, that dream of control, whether of a people (in 
the name of the people) or of the planet.
 But the claimant to overei#nty have only ti#htened the nooe upon an 
expirin# humanity: the tate, the party, the market, perhap what i today 
even called freedom.  Thee overei#ntie come heraldin# deliverance of 
humanity only to further extin#uih the li#ht of humanity, of life itelf.  For it 
i in the name of freedom that we have invaion and occupation, in the name 
of freedom that the Patriot Act ti#hten the #rip of urveillance, in the name 
of freedom that the people of the earth are held hota#e to the predatory 
power of caino capitalim.23)
 To hope for alvation ha eemed ever to hope for the comin# of a 
overei#n, for the return of the kin#.
 I there any other ort of hope?
 It i here that Derrida return to the declaration or plea of Heide##er: 
only a #od can ave u.  But i thi not preciely the hope that alway 
deliver humanity over to it own death?
 What ort of #od could it be that could in any meanin#ful ene ave u, 
that i, make u more rather than le human, more rather than le 
reponible, jut, humane.  Would it not have to be…a #od without 
overei#nty?
 Here i what he then write: “To be ure, nothin# i le ure than a #od 
without overei#nty: nothin# i le ure than hi comin#, to be ure”(114).
 We mut paue here.  For the thou#ht of a #od without overei#nty i 
22) Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Philosophy (Chica#o, 
Univerity of Chica#o Pre, 1985), p.36.
23) Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (London, St. Martin’ Pre, 1997).
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after all not one that can eaily be thou#ht, if indeed it can be thou#ht at all. 
For “#od” and “overei#nty” are virtually ynonym.  If God i diveted of 
overei#nty, what then remain that mi#ht be termed divine?  I not a 
mi#hty God, a powerful God, a tron# God the very eence of what we 
dream of when we dream of the comin# of God, and perhap even more 
when we dream of a God who ave, who come preciely to ave?   I thi 
not alway the dream of thoe who need recue from the force that hold 
them captive?  And i it not in the name of thi dream, even if it i the dream 
of the oppreed, that the powerful pretend to rule a viceroy of thi avin# 
power?  The power of liberation from vulnerability and inecurity.    I it not 
thi very dream of the oppreed that i eized upon alway and everywhere 
by their oppreor to become the very intrument of their power and force? 
What can deliver humanity, actually exitin# humanity, from thi dream of 
power, of overei#nty, of control, by which we eek deliverance from the 
power that afflict humanity only by fallin# ever more ecurely into the 
hand of that which entrap u?
 And o we eem to be cau#ht in a dilemma: if we hope for the comin# of 
a God with overei#nty then we fall into the trap of power, we prepare for 
the comin# of power that enlave humanity.  But if we hope for the comin# 
of a #od without power, without mi#ht, without force or violence and o 
without overei#nty, then in what way can thi really be a hope for that 
which can deliver, can ave, can redeem?
 The much cited tale i pertinent here: eein# the meiah a a be##ar 
amon# be##ar outide the city #ate, one ak of him: when will you come? 
For the bein# without overei#nty (a a be##ar therefore, a the one who i 
vulnerable and needy rather than in plenitude…) i not the comin#, but 
eem to be the contrary of the comin#, the advent, the parouia with power.
 Jut to make thin# a bit more complicated we hould recall that the 
‘work’ of uch an advent i aid to be to ave u.  But how can a meiah 
without overei#nty ave?  Or i thi the only meiah who could deliver 
humanity from it dream turned ni#htmare of power, of control, of 
overei#nty?
 Toward the concluion of the econd eay that make up the volume 
The Violence of God: Before and After 149
Rogues, and o which continue and conclude Derrida’ reflection on 
power and on hope for a radically different kind of ocial reality, one in 
which the claim of jutice i heeded, but without force or violence, without 
the dream of overei#nty, he a#ain return to the ayin# of Heide##er with 
which we be#an.  Thi time he fill out a bit more what a #od without 
overei#nty mi#ht mean.
 Derrida write: “In peakin# of an ontotheolo#y of overei#nty, I am 
referrin# here, under the name of God, the One and Only God, to the 
determination of a overei#n, and thu indiviible, omnipotence.  For 
wherever the name of God would allow u to think omethin# ele, for 
example a vulnerable overei#nty, one that uffer and i diviible, one that 
i mortal even, … it would be a completely different tory, perhap even the 
tory of a #od who decontruct himelf in hi ipeity”(157).
 You will be relieved to know that I will not, on thi occaion, eek to 
clarify the meanin# of decontruct or even of ipeity.  I will leave thi phrae 
han#in# in the air.
 What I will do i to point to jut a few of the way in which the thinkin# 
that #ather itelf here in the concluion to thee remarkable eay i a 
thinkin# of the theolo#ical.  Indeed it i omethin# like a provocation to 
what ince the time of Luther ha been referred to a a theolo#y of the cro, 
or a thinkin# of the cro, but the cro of the meianic humanity that wa 
and perhap till i tortured and executed by the enforcer of empire.
 But it i not a thinkin# of what i familiar to u a reli#ion.  It i indeed 
the ort of thinkin# that Bonhoeffer in hi Letters and Papers from Prison24) wa 
tryin# to clarify a a reli#ionle thinkin#, a thinkin# without and even 
a#aint reli#ion, includin# mot epecially what claim for itelf the title of 
Chritianity (328).    Bonhoeffer himelf had paid tribute in thee ame pa#e 
to Karl Barth for havin# deciively broken with reli#ion in the name of 
faith25), for havin# lucidly reco#nized and affirmed the radical difference 
24) Macmillan, New York, 1971.
25) The fundamental ditinction between reli#ion and faith i one that Derrida, who otherwie 
eem not to know much of Karl Barth, alo point to when he write: “But in the ame 
way a I make a ditinction between jutice and law, I think you have to ditin#uih 
between reli#ion and faith.” Paper Machine (Stanford, Stanford Univerity Pre, 2005), 117.
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between a faith that i faithfulne to the Gopel and a reli#ion that erect 
itelf a an intitution claimin# to ecure for u our relation to a God who 
anwer to our reli#iou need.  For reli#ion, and I mean of coure 
Chritianity, even at it bet eem to be almot entirely elf-aborbed, 
caterin# to the elf aborption of thoe who come eekin# a haven from a 
heartle world.  And at it wort it i the ideolo#ical helpmate for 
domination and diviion.
 But faith or faithfulne without reli#ion: what mi#ht that mean?  And 
how i it to be thou#ht in relation to the weakne of a #od who come?
 Bonhoeffer himelf had already be#un to think of the weakne of #od, 
of the #od whoe weakne omehow i the #opel. For God, he write from 
prion on July 16 of 1944 “i weak and powerle, and…thi i the only way 
that God i with u and can help u” (360)  for “only the ufferin# God can 
help”(361).  It wa thi ini#ht that Moltmann ou#ht to think throu#h all the 
way to the end in hi Crucified God.
 Bonhoeffer alo ou#ht to think what fidelity to uch a God mi#ht mean, 
fidelity not in term of reli#iou practice which even if they mi#ht exit 
hould be utterly hidden away, a Jeu aid of prayer, for example.  But 
fidelity in the world, a fidelity that Bonhoeffer alo named a keepin# watch 
with a certain God in hi weakne a the diciple could not do in 
Gethemane (361). A watchfulne that Dorothee Soelle articulated a 
“political  prayer” in the tru##le a#aint a #lobalized military indutrial 
complex.
 I will not eek now to unpack what may and mut be aid about the 
atonihin# fact that a theolo#y of the cro, a thinkin# of our world in 
relation to a #od who i crucified, appear outide the church, outide what 
call itelf Chritianity, outide what may be termed a pecifically reli#iou 
tradition.
 Intead I will imply point to what eem to me to be at take in 
theolo#y today, in both the tudy and the doin# of theolo#y, that i, in 
theolo#ical thinkin# today.
 Firt I will recall omethin# ele that Bonhoeffer noted lon# a#o, that it 
i often enou#h the cae that one can peak more openly and freely about 
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theolo#y, about faith, with atheit than i poible with thoe who call 
themelve Chritian.  That amon# the mot fruitful dialo# partner for the 
theolo#ian today are thoe who like Derrida are ri#htly re#arded a atheit. 
And that thi i perhap epecially true when it come to dealin# with what 
Paul in Galatian called the truth of the #opel or what in Firt Corinthian 
he call the mea#e concernin# the cro, of the foolihne and weakne of 
God.
 And that thi i o becaue what i at take in theolo#ical thinkin# today 
i not tinkerin# with the reli#iou elf-undertandin# of reli#iou intitution 
and till le with providin# notrum for a narciitic pirituality but rather 
tryin# to think reolutely and lucidly about a future for humanity and for 
life itelf in the face of the menace of elf-inflicted biocide.  That real 
theolo#ical thinkin# i directed toward the quetion of the deliverance of the 
earth and the earthlin# from the empire of avarice, arro#ance and violence.
 And thi mean that theolo#ical thinkin# i above all a political 
thinkin#, a thinkin# of the call and claim of jutice, a thinkin# of the 
condition of #eneroity and olidarity, of a non-aller#ic bein# with one 
another, a thinkin# of meianic hope.
 But a meianic hope without the dream of overei#nty, even or 
epecially without the overei#nty of God, without a return of the Kin#, 
without power and mi#ht.  But rather, a meianicity of vulnerability, 
vulnerability to the other, to the nei#hbor, to the tran#er,  to the enemy, to 
the unknown and the unknowable. A meianicity, in hort, of unretricted 
love, without which there i no future at all for life on earth.
 And perhap thi mut be#in, for u, with a renunciation of what ha 
been called God, a renunciation of the dream of one who come in power to 
deliver, and a turnin# intead to that which i mot vulnerable in the world; 
a watchin# and waitin# with that which i mot vulnerable, with what the 
world, indeed the political and reli#iou world, coni#n to abjection and 
death.
 In the midt of all our elf-preoccupation, our concern about ourelve, 
our piritual need or our vocation, our intitution or our churche can we 
take time to prepare ourelve and our world for the comin# of the only #od 
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who can ave u, the one without overei#nty, without power and mi#ht, the 
one who bid u watch and wait,
 The one who i jutice without law, #ift without return, welcome 
without condition, whoe lat name i love.
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Abstract
 In the time in which we live there are many voice that cry out for 
divinely anctioned violence. How doe the name of God come to be 
aociated with violence?  And i there an alternative way of namin# God 
that point u away from violence? We attend firt  to the voice of thoe 
who are called “church father” to notice how initently they call upon u 
to think of a God without violence, a God who tand not in continuity with, 
but in utter contrat to the violence of empire and nation. We then turn to 
the contruction in pre-modern Europe of a very different view of God, one 
that make God to be o aociated with violence a to make the wielder of 
human violence to eem like the very repreentative of God. Finally  we 
conider ome of the way in which the aociation between God and 
violence are brou#ht into quetion in our own time.  While thi occur in 
many way in the theolo#ical and philoophical reflection of the lat decade 
I  pay particular attention to thi decontruction of the aociation of the 
divine and violence in the work of Jacque Derrida. The way the name of 
God i deployed i re#ularly connected to the behavior of thoe who are 
called upon to imitate the divine a the ima#e and reflection of God in the 
world.
